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EUCLID'S PARALLEL POSTULATE.* "
BY OSWALD VEBLEN.
MATHEMATICIANS are in possession of several bodies of
theory which they call geometries. A geometry (and, indeed,
a mathematical science in general) is a set of propositions stated in
terms of symbols some of which are defined in terms of others,
but some of which are necessarily undefined. The majority of the
propositions (those called theorems) are logical consequences of
other propositions, but some of the propositions are necessarily un-
proved. The latter are called axioms or postulates or, more plainly,
unproved propositions. In its mathematical aspect, a geometry is
rather completely characterized by its undefined symbols and its
unproved propositions since all other features of the science are
derived from these by the two processes of definition and deduction.
Geometries might have, but actually have not, been created in
an accidental or artificial manner. The symbols (in particular the
undefined symbols) of geometry stand for the words that we use
in describing that complex of sensations, perceptions, etc., called
space, and its propositions are statements which one makes (or may
make if learned enough) about space. Thus there are two ques-
tions which may be asked about a geometrical proposition: (i) Is
it an axiom or a consequence of the axioms of a certain geometry?
(2) Is it true of space? The first of these questions is strictly mathe-
matical. The second belongs perhaps to mathematics, perhaps to
natural science, but probably to philosophy. The two questions
were formerly jumbled into one and it is only in recent years that
the mathematicians have fully separated them.
For a long time, there existed only one geometry, that of Euclid,
and this geometry because of its uniqueness occupied a post of pecu-
liar sanctity. Its propositions were not only held to be true of space,
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but they were supposed by many (e. g. Kant) to be necessary laws
of thought. In the last century, however, there appeared on the
scene first one, and then many, geometries which contained propo-
sitions different from those of Euclid. These geometries are in the
first place so logically consistent that if one of them contains a self-
contradiction, so does Euclid, and in the second place certain of them,
notably those of Lobatchewsky and Riemann, have claims to truth
that rival those of Euclid.
The philosophical importance of a theory which, on the face
of the returns, seems to destroy Kant's main example of an a priori
synthetic judgment will hardly be questioned. But on account of
the difficulty of the technical language of the philosophers for the
mathematicians and vice versa, the subject has not yet had an ade-
quate discussion.
Mr. Withers is one of the first who comes to the subject as a
philosopher and yet is in possession of the necessary mathematics.
His book, which is a Yale Doctor's Thesis, begins with a history of
the mathematical researches that is probably clearer than any avail-
able to non-mathematicians in English. It does not contain a com-
plete account of the corresponding philosophical discussions—an
omission which probably makes for clearness since many of the
discussions were beclouded by misunderstandings between the math-
ematicians and philosophers.
The historical introduction is followed by a couple of chapters
which, waiving for a moment the notion that no thought is possible
which does not presuppose a Euclidean space, discuss the claims of
the geometries of Euclid, Lobatchewsky, and Riemann to validity
as exponents of our geometrical experience. Mr. Withers reaches
the conclusion, familiar to mathematicians, that we cannot at pres-
ent decide ; that a decision against Euclid is possible ; that one ab-
solutely in his favor probably is not. In the discussion leading to
this result, by some remarks on the empirical origin and the psy-
chology of certain conceptions like that of direction he successfully
disposes of several of the usual errors.
On the other hand, a mathematician is pretty sure to feel the
need of a few more "ifs" and "buts." For example, on pages 106-
107 where the author very clearly exposes the "shortest distance"
fallacy, he ought also to note that distance can be defined analytically
so as to avoid the difficulty. Without citing further instances we
will assert that throughout the book there are statements uttered
directly that a mathematician would prefer to see qualified. We will
not deny, however, that for the purpose of conveying the right
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emphasis the methods of Mr. Withers may be better than the attempt
at Hteral accuracy of a mathematician.
There are places where Mr. Withers seems to overlook tempo-
rarily the nature of an abstract science. For example, he regards
it as a difficulty (page 112) that Fieri should use undefined symbols
and unproved propositions which involve metrical ideas in making
a definition of metrical terms; and of Riemann he says (pp. 112,
113) : "In other words by assuming metrical properties in his ds
and then proceeding to determine these properties upon the basis
of this assumption, he easily draws out at the faucet what he has
already poured in at the bung." But this is what we always do in
mathematics. In geometry no more than elsewhere do we expect
to get something for nothing. The axioms of a science must neces-
sarily involve the whole structure. We never expect to generate
anything by a logical process. By mathematical language we can
never tell the meaning, say of a straight line, (cf. Chap. IV), in
any other sense than that we utter a set of propositions, logically
related and including the statements that can be made about straight
lines.
It seems that by being more explicit in his statements about
abstract science in general, Mr. Withers might have considerably
abbreviated and improved his statements about curvature of space
and the necessity or lack of necessity of assuming a Euclidean
space of higher dimensions in order to realize a space of constant
positive or negative curvature. Presumably for a like reason, the
discussion of Peano's work on pages 107-108 seems to confuse two
separate studies in one of which "distance" was the undefined sym-
bol and in the other of which the notion of "betweenness" was
fundamental.*
After having shown that Euclid's geometry cannot be proved
true by any appeal to experience, Mr. Withers decides in the last
two chapters that there is no way of accomplishing this result by an
a priori method. We have remarked above on the details of this
argument and here raise only one further question
—
perhaps without
putting it in a clear-cut form. How shall we use the word exist?
There is a technical usage which says that a mathematical science
(cf. our first paragraphs) exists if no two propositions deducible
from its hypotheses are in contradiction. In this sense (due to
*We note in passing that the second footnote reference on page 108 is
incorrect; that in the bibliography under the single head, Moore, appear
works of two men, one an American and the other an EngHshman ; that on
page 96, line 7, the word "of" should be deleted; that on page 142, "motion'
is printed for "notion."
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Hilbert) we are able to say that all mathematical sciences exist if
arithmetic exists— i. e., the science of the positive whole numbers.
One is tempted to say that surely the whole numbers, i, 2, 3. . . .etc.
exist. But what would be the content of such a statement? and do
we know these numbers except by the propositions which we wish
to prove consistent?
A more difficult form of the same question would be to ask
what Mr. Withers means by such language as this : " . . . . nor is it
maintained that a merely formal world could really exist or be truly
known if it did exist" (page 147). Or the following from pages
160-161 : "We cannot in any a priori fashion dogmatically deny the
existence of a four-dimensional space-world any more than our two-
dimensional beings could deny that our world exists." Altogether
the discussion in Mr. Withers' last chapter is obscured by the lack
of a satisfactory meaning for the word "exist."
We have taken pains to warn the reader not to accept all the
statements of Mr. Withers as representing a mathematical point of
view with strict accuracy because we believe that the book, on ac-
count of its general clearness, ought to have a wide circle of readers.
It might well be read as an introduction to the large work of Russell
on the Principles of Mathematics.
